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ABSTRACT 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) tends to be associated with a Massively Modular (MM) 
cognitive architecture. I argue that EP favors a non-MM cognitive architecture. The main point 
of dispute is whether central cognition, such as abstract reasoning, exhibits domain-general 
properties. Partisans of EP argue that domain-specific modules govern central cognition, for it is 
unclear how the cognitive mind could have evolved domain-generality. In response, I defend a 
distinction between exogenous and endogenous selection pressures, according to which 
exogenous pressures tend to select for domain-specificity, whereas the latter, endogenous 
pressures, select in favor of domain-generality. I draw on models from brain network theory to 
motivate this distinction, and also to establish that a domain-general, non-MM cognitive 
architecture is the more parsimonious adaptive solution to endogenous pressures. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Biological systems and mechanisms are putative products of evolutionary processes. A 
guiding principle of the theory of evolution by natural selection is that the emergence of such 
products is explicable in terms of adaptive advantage and fitness-enhancement (Boyer 2015: 186; 
Buss 1995: 2; Cosmides and Tooby 1994: 86). By reverse engineering the functional properties 
of, say, claws and wings, it is possible to locate the etiology of these adaptations in selective 
pressures that recurred throughout a species’ phylogenetic history (Sober 1984: 211) – for 
example, claws for protection and predation, and wings for foraging and escape. This analysis 
accordingly identifies not only the emergence of adaptations, but also their stability across 
generations in phylogenetic history. Adaptations build upon one another to create more complex 
structures conducive to survival and reproductive viability (Sperber 2004: 53-4). In evolutionary 
psychology (EP), this research paradigm gets applied to the functional analysis of the cognitive 
mind, including the properties, structures, and general architecture of human thought (Buss 1995: 
2; Cosmides and Tooby 1994: 86). The explanatory scope of EP encompasses the processing that 
takes place in lower-level sensory systems like vision and audition, which I will refer to as 
perception, as well as higher-order systems that mediate conceptual reasoning, belief formation, 
and other facets of distinctively human thought, a cluster I will call central cognition. 
The primary question I will address here is: what sort of cognitive architecture follows from 
the principles of evolutionary psychology? Practitioners of evolutionary psychology usually 
argue in favor of a massively modular (hereafter, MM) architecture (Carruthers 2006; Sperber 
2002; 2004).1 My aim is to challenge this thesis, and argue that evolutionary psychology 
supports a non-MM cognitive architecture.  
                                                
1	Some philosophers regard massive modularity as a cluster of views bound together by a family resemblance 
relation, rather than a narrowly defined thesis (Weiskopf 2010: 28). The construal of massive modularity I treat here 
2 
To argue for my claim, I start in section 2 by elaborating on the MM thesis and why EP 
theorists tend to favor such cognitive architectures. In section 2.1, I sketch the selection 
pressures argument, attributable to Cosmides and Tooby (1997), which makes the claim that a 
non-MM cognitive architecture possessing domain-general functional properties could not have 
evolved. In section 3, I set the background for my defense of non-MM architecture against the 
selection pressures argument. I will show how the term ‘selection pressure’ is open to various 
interpretations, which differ with respect to the cognitive architecture that EP should favor. It 
will be argued that some selection pressures – call these endogenous pressures – lead to adaptive 
solutions that are candidates of domain-general processing in central cognition. Section 4 covers 
a response from MM theorists, highlighting how adaptations to endogenous pressures would still 
count as modules. This response would render superfluous domain-general mechanisms posited 
by non-MM architectures. In section 5, I attempt to undermine the MM thesis by drawing on 
findings from neural network topology (Bullmore 2012; Sporns 2010, 2012) to illustrate why 
endogenous pressures selected for domain general mechanisms. By these lights, EP should adopt 
the non-MM framework in virtue of its supplying the more parsimonious hypothesis, compared 
to the MM framework, of how the cognitive mind evolved to overcome endogenous selection 
pressures. I conclude by sketching possible directions for further development of the non-MM 
account of cognitive architecture.  
 
2 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND MASSIVE MODULARITY 
The evolutionary psychologists David Buss (1995) and Tooby and Cosmides (1994; 1995; 
1997) described the methodology of evolutionary psychology (EP) as subsuming, integrating and 
                                                                                                                                                       
represents a distillation of claims attributable to committed modularists, a group that includes Carruthers (2006), 
Sperber (2004), and Cosmides and Tooby (1994).	
3 
uniting the disparate psychological theories of the human mind under a single set of paradigmatic 
principles. The paradigmatic principles supply a explanatory framework that places central 
importance on the concepts of Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, fitness, adaptation, 
and selection pressures, all cornerstones of evolutionary theorizing.2  These concepts map onto 
features of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness (Boyer 2015: 189; Buss 2005; Tooby 
and Cosmides 1987: 5, 1994: 87) in which ancestral organisms encountered recurring threats to 
survival and reproduction and gradually developed adaptive mechanisms that overcame these 
threats. It is in the sense of locating selection pressures in the external environment that some 
theorizers, particularly Cosmides and Tooby (1994; 1995; 1997), adopt an externalist orientation 
to elucidating the fitness advantages afforded by adaptations.  
The Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness most relevant to forming hypotheses about 
human psychology corresponds to the Pleistocene era, spanning a period between 1.8 million to 
10,000 years ago (Buller 2005: 9; Tooby and Cosmides 1994: 87). Prehistoric hunter-gatherers 
struggled against an array of adaptive problems relating to resource acquisition, avoiding 
dangerous predators, overcoming conspecific rivals, securing shelter, finding mates, and raising 
offspring (Buss 1995: 9-10). These adaptive problems would tend to threaten the reproductive 
viability and survival of ancestral humans. Such problems imposed a selection pressure in favor 
of cognitive mechanisms, so-called “mental organs,” that were suited to overcoming each 
adaptive problem (Pinker 1997: 21).  If the evolving minds of hunter-gatherers lacked the 
inference rules and problem-solving capacities to find resources, secure shelter, establish and 
follow norms, and avoid predation, the survival and reproduction of those hominid ancestors 
would have been jeopardized. Variations lacking such capacities would be less fit, and therefore 
                                                
2	Additional concepts distinctive to evolutionary approaches to the study of cognition and behavior are “function,” 
“regulation,” “computational architecture,” “organization,” “design,” “entropy,” “replication,” “by-product,” and 
“task environment” (see Cosmides &Tooby 1987: 8). 
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less likely to reproduce. This pattern would have led to the retention of fitness-enhancing traits in 
subsequent generations. That is, organisms that were able to overcome selection pressures were 
more likely to survive, reproduce, and pass genes encoding for those traits on to the next 
generation. 
 Some theorists propose that natural selection tends to favor specialized adaptive traits 
(Sperber 1994; Carruthers 2006). Specialized solutions to selection pressures are tailored to 
address a particular type of threat to the organism’s survival.3 One of the defining characteristics 
of specialized adaptations is that they carry out specific, well-circumscribed functions that are 
ultimately conducive to survival and reproduction (Godfrey-Smith 2013: 51). There are sundry 
examples of specialization documented throughout biology. Examples of such mechanisms 
include lungs for breathing, hearts for pumping blood, and so on. Identifying a mechanism’s 
specific functional role and its attendant fitness enhancement correspond to its raison d’être from 
the perspective of evolutionary theorizing. A sketch of specialized functionality is the starting 
point for describing why externalist approaches to evolutionary psychology (which I will 
continue to shorten, for brevity, to EP) favor modular mechanisms.  
The term module carries a strict definitional usage in explanatory framework of EP. In order 
to evaluate the inference from principles of EP to a well-defined cognitive architecture, we must 
further clarify which necessary and sufficient conditions a mechanism must satisfy in order to be 
called a module. At the most general level, think of modules as computational mechanisms,4 
                                                
3 The strength of this claim notwithstanding, cases of multifunctional mechanisms and traits arising by means other 
than selection have been known since Gould and Vrba (1982: 6). For instance, there are so-called exaptations, which 
are adaptations that are coopted to serve additional functions, as well as spandrels that emerge as developmental 
byproducts of adaptations (ibid. 6).	
4	Describing modules as computational mechanisms equivocates between two senses of computation (Samuels 
1998: 579). Modules may be computational under either the hardware conception or the algorithm conception (Ibid. 
579). In the hardware sense, modules are specialized computers identical to specific neural networks. On the latter 
interpretation, modules as specialized sub-routines or mental programs – on this account, modules could be 
5 
specialized sub-routines or sub-systems within the overall cognitive architecture (Fodor 1983: 
36-38; 2000: 91). There is not much consensus on how many conditions there are or how many 
must be met before any mechanism qualifies as modular (Carruthers 2006a: 3). Consider that in 
The Modularity of Mind, Fodor proposed nine distinct features that typify modules (1983: 47-
101).5 It will suffice for present purposes to regard modular mechanisms as distinguished only by 
the subset of three properties that Carruthers (2006a) and Sperber (2004) are respectively 
committed to in their massive modularity frameworks. The three basic properties of modules are 
(1) domain-specificity, (2) encapsulation, and (3) mandatory operation (Fodor 1983: 36-7, 47, 
52, 64).  
Starting with (1), modules are domain-specific insofar as they process either a specific type 
of input (Carruthers 2006) or deliver a specific output to perform a function further downstream 
in central cognition (Cosmides and Tooby 1994: 94). If I perceive a cat, for instance, the relevant 
transducer or perceptual apparatus, in this case the cones and rods in my retinas and the axonal 
connections extending therefrom, relays information to the relevant cortical regions that take 
these perceptual data as inputs. The deliverances of these cortical processing regions produce a 
mental representation of the observed environmental feature as output (e.g. a mental 
representation of the perceived cat).6 The representational output is then available as a discrete, 
manipulable component in central cognition (e.g. enabling the formation of beliefs and 
inferences about the cat).  
                                                                                                                                                       
implemented across disparate neural networks (Samuels 1998: 579). I will assume the algorithmic conception that 
the evolutionary psychologists Tooby and Cosmides (1997) explicitly endorse in their account of modularity (81).	
5	According to Fodor’s original formulation (1983), modules are: (1) localized, (2) subject to characteristic 
breakdowns, (3) mandatory, (4) fast, (5) shallow, (6) ontogenetically determined, (7) domain specific, (8) 
inaccessible, and (9) informationally encapsulated.	
6	For purposes of exposition, I provisionally adopt the representational theory of mind (RTM) in the present 
analysis. The basic idea is that the outputs of perceptual processing are representations whose role is to enter into 
cognitive processes like abductive inference, deductive reasoning, and other facets of central cognition.		
6 
Perhaps it’s uncontroversial to state that the mind contains input-specific processors acting 
on databases – that sense of domain-specificity could hold true for many models of cognition, 
even on the non-modular accounts (cf. Fodor 2000: 58). The more contentious claim is that each 
module is an adaptation that evolved independently as a “mental organ” that is a universal 
feature of human cognition, each module suited to solving a specific adaptive problem (Buller 
2006: 92; Pinker 1997: 21, 49). Recall that perceptual inputs are supposed to determine which 
modules upstream in central cognition end up getting activated. By adding the qualification 
about adaptive value to the mix, the revised order of operations approximates to: ‘different 
modules get activated based on whether the perceptual information meets the specific input 
conditions that characterize the actual and a proper domain of any given module’ (Sperber 2004: 
55). The proper domain corresponds to bodies of knowledge and functional properties that have 
special evolutionary significance (Sperber 2004: 55). In other words, a module’s proper domain 
refers to the inputs and functional properties for which the module was selected: that is, whatever 
carries out the function for which the module emerged as an adaptation (Buller 2005: 57). On the 
other hand, a module’s actual domain extends far beyond its proper domain, and refers to any 
perceptual feature that may trigger the module (Ibid. 55). For example, the ‘face-recognition 
device,’ itself putatively a module with adaptive value, responds to perceptual cues beyond what 
is exhibited by real human faces. For instance, a jagged rock formation on the side of a mountain 
may exhibit structural properties sufficiently similar to a human face such that it activates the 
face-recognition device. To summarize then: the perceptual features of actual faces correspond to 
the module’s proper domain, and recognizing faces carries adaptive value, plausibly by assisting 
in nonverbal communication and inter-personal, cooperative behavior among conspecifics 
(Green 2016: 2).  
7 
A corollary of the foregoing is that perceptual cues falling outside the parameters of a 
module’s actual domain will not activate it. Suppose I perceive a doorway or a computer instead 
of the jagged rock formation. The perceptual features of the doorway and computer are 
sufficiently dissimilar from those of faces so that the face-recognition module is unlikely to play 
any part in subsequent cognitive processing. Rather, the respective modules that get recruited 
would process information proper to, say, SHELTER or TOOL-USE, modules with proper or actual 
domains responsive to the available perceptual inputs (Pinker 1994: 420). To clarify further, the 
perceptual cues that activate the SHELTER module may correspond to the door handle and 
oblong, hinged doors, and in other instance the TOOL-USE module may get activated by 
keyboards and monitors. To sum up, the boundaries of modules are defined over different 
categories of perceptual inputs.  
Moving on to feature (2), modules are encapsulated in the sense of being computationally 
impenetrable by other modules and sub-systems, and are capable of accessing only their own 
proprietary databases. Put more succinctly, higher-order cognitive systems cannot penetrate the 
information stored in each module, and from the standpoint of any one module the operations of 
the cognitive systems outside its own database are opaque (Weiskopf 2010: 8). The PREDATOR 
module, for instance, would access its own database, presumably containing information about 
threats in the external environment. How the PREDATOR module runs its computations to 
determine what counts as a predator is inaccessible to higher-order cognitive processes. By parity 
of reasoning, the PREDATOR module cannot access the data or computational processes contained 
in the SOCIAL EXCHANGE module (presuming of course that the latter modular system, dealing 
with cost-benefit analysis in conspecific relations and reciprocity, is a discrete modular system). 
By regarding modules are isolable computational systems, the flow of information through 
8 
cognition is restricted only to modules whose actual or proper input domains are sufficiently 
relevant to the on-going task (Sperber 2004: 60-1). If my perceptual system delivers inputs that 
cause me to form a mental representation of a lion crouched in front of me, predictably followed 
by lion-related thoughts and inferences (e.g. THE LION IS DANGEROUS, therefore, I SHOULD RUN 
TO SAFETY), this should be a consequence of the relevant PREDATOR module consulting only its 
own proprietary database. 
There is less convergence on whether the third feature should count as necessary for all 
cognitive modules, but I include (3), mandatory operations, following Sperber’s architectural 
framework (2004: 60), one of the more influential exponents of the MM thesis, which posits 
modules that function accordingly. We may define this feature as a form of automatic processing 
with two conditions: the appropriate perceptual input (i.e., cues that activate the module’s actual 
or proper domain) sufficiently triggers processing procedures that (a) cannot be interrupted by 
other sub-systems, so that the modular operation will run its course and ‘ignore’ other cognitive 
systems during processing. The modular operation is also mandatory in the sense of being (b) 
involuntary in operation once input conditions are satisfied, akin to a “cognitive reflex,” hence 
the cognitive procedure cannot be consciously willed or blocked by the agent (2004: 60-1). 
Regardless of the thoughts I entertain, the perceptual information automatically triggers the 
module whose output results in my perceiving a cat in front of me. Optical illusions serve as a 
useful illustration of this phenomenon of mandatory operation. The persistence of the Müller-
Lyer illusion – where two lines appear to be of different lengths, even though they are actually 
equal in length – shows how conditions (a) and (b) may be true of the mechanisms that mediate 
the perception of the figures in this illusion (see Zeman et al. [2013] for an in-depth analysis of 
the computational mechanisms behind the illusion). 
9 
Having covered the three basic features of modular mechanisms, we return to the inferential 
link from EP to massive modularity. The inference from the adaptive problems identified in the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness of hunter-gatherer ancestors to an ensemble of 
modules in cognitive architecture should now be straightforward. The pattern of assigning 
specific functions that impart survival advantages should apply as well to the structures of 
cognition as it does to the other organ systems; each component, or module, of the human mind 
emerged as an adaptive solution to a specific problem, eventually resulting in a collection of 
modules that together facilitate central cognition in cognitive architecture (Carruthers 2013a: 8; 
Sperber 2004: 54).  
How, then, did all the cognitive faculties like memory and executive function, including even 
individual databases like TOOL and SHELTER, evolve to become the constitutive modules of the 
overall cognitive architecture? If cognitive modules gradually arose throughout phylogenic 
history in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, then it should be possible to reverse 
engineer the mind in terms of the relevant selective pressures and adaptations that locate the 
etiology of each cognitive module (Cosmides & Tooby 1997). EP generates hypotheses about the 
selective pressures that recurred in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness and induced 
the emergence of each module. Sperber (2004) observes that MM in the maximal sense follows 
from EP only if each (or almost every) mechanism comprising perception and central cognition 
counts as a module. And it helps to reiterate the qualification that modules’ proper conceptual 
domains correspond to bodies of knowledge, databases, and functionality that have special 
evolutionary significance (Sperber 2004: 54-56). Returning to the face-recognition device, EP 
hypothesizes that the recognition of conspecifics’ faces carried with it the adaptive benefit of 
tracking rivals and mates, friend and foe, family and outsider, etc. A specialized module that we 
10 
call the face-recognition device gradually evolved to solve this adaptive problem, and was 
retained as a universal feature of human cognition due its fitness benefit.  
To give an example of how even individual databases, construed as ‘micromodules’ on some 
MM accounts (Sperber 1994: 48), could manifest modular properties, Boyer (2015) specifies 
OWNERSHIP as the prototypical case of the EP paradigm in action:  
The proposal here is that intuitions and motivations concerning who uses what resources 
constitute […] a coordination tool for humans – and evolved from less efficient coordination 
strategies in the course of human evolution. In this perspective, the complex of intuitions 
generally called ownership are the outcome of largely tacit computations concerning the 
relative costs and benefits of using, guarding, or poaching resources, as well as collaborating 
with others in these diverse courses of action (190). 
On Boyer’s understanding of adaptive advantage, the OWNERSHIP module arose to meet 
decision-making challenges regarding the coordination of resource allocation. Notice, though, 
that if OWNERSHIP is a module, it should be (1) domain-specific and (2) encapsulated, and (3) 
mandatory in operation. For x to recognize that y owns F, the occurrent perceptual features must 
(1) fall within the actual domain of x’s OWNERSHIP module, (2) process only its own proprietary 
database while being impenetrable by other modules, and (3) carry out its mandated process 
automatically. Note that mandatory automatic processing need not entail inflexible responses 
though (Sperber 2002: 2). A cascade of modular activations may underlie the computations 
involved in decisions of ownership, where modules further downstream in central cognition 
determine whether to cooperate, reciprocate, or share a resource. Even if x recognizes that y 
owns F, modularists like Sperber (2002: 3) and Carruthers (2006: 6) account for the many 
permutations of behavior (e.g., cooperation, reciprocation, and sharing) that relate to ownership-
11 
related circumstances by distinguishing between lower-level perceptual modules and higher-
order central cognition modules. The lower order modules deliver representations in a typically 
mandatory fashion, still like cognitive reflexes. Meanwhile, the higher-order modules that govern 
central cognition correspond to different processors that integrate representations in higher-order 
thought processes like reasoning. The MM proposal is that this line of reasoning, mutatis 
mutandis, can be run for each module in the cognitive architecture until the final result is a mind 
maximally (or almost entirely) composed of specialized processors and databases. Mithen (1996) 
helpfully compares this architecture to a Swiss army knife, with each tool in the kit analogous to 
the modules of the cognitive mind.  
To summarize, the unifying claim of MM is that human cognitive architecture is exhaustively 
composed of a plurality of modules, all working in concert to mediate perception and central 
cognition. I take Carruthers (2006a) and Sperber (2004) as representatively holding the strong 
thesis that both perception and central cognition, or at least almost every aspect of both,7 fall 
under the purview of modular processing. Indeed, everything from lower-level perception to 
higher-order conceptual reasoning and belief formation as being governed predominantly by an 
ensemble of modules (Tooby and Cosmides 1995: xiii; Samuels 1998: 576; Sperber 2004; 
Carruthers 2006). The diagram below illustrates the MM schema. 
                                                
7	Some proponents of the MM thesis, including Carruthers (2013: 10371), as well as Cosmides & Tooby (2000: 
1260), regard their thesis as compatible with there being some systems, such as working memory, that exhibit 
domain general features. That concession is still compatible with the overarching MM claim that the central 
cognition is predominantly outfitted with domain-specific modules and specialized problem-solving circuits 
(Cosmides & Tooby 2000: 1261). More precisely, the MM thesis denies that central cognition is constituted by a 
domain-general central system (Tooby & Cosmides 2000: 1171).	
12 
 
Fig. 1: Theoretical Schema of Massive Modularity 
Fig. 1 summarizes the theoretical framework. First, peripheral modules process incoming 
perceptual information, as when processors take a retinal image from the eye and produce a 
visual representation as output. These representational outputs are then relayed to central 
modular processes, also called ‘higher-order modules.’ Higher-order modules convert the 
representational feed into concepts that enter into the more complex reasoning tasks of central 
cognition, namely inference and deduction, belief formation, or analogical reasoning – and each 
of these higher-order cognitive processes are modular systems as well (Carruthers 2013: 143).8 
The key point is clarify is that MM architectures regard both perception and central cognition as 
governed primarily by modules. 
EP and MM, therefore, go hand-in-hand. EP supplies a systematic way of identifying 
selection pressures in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. MM describes a cognitive 
architecture wherein each mechanism’s proper domain corresponds to adaptive solutions to each 
                                                
8	MM theorists differ on what counts as higher-order modules. For instance, in Carruthers’s MM framework (2006) 
the language content-integrator is the higher-order module, and on Sperber’s account (1994, 2000) the 
metarepresentation module plays this role.	
Diagramed above is a simplified model of the order of information processing within the MM cognitive 
architecture. What makes the above massively modular is ascribing modular systems to perception (the peripheral 
processes) as well as central cognition (cf. Sperber [2004], and Carruthers [2006]). Diagram taken from Nettle 
(2007: 261). 
13 
selection pressure. Conjoining EP with MM suggests how modules alone could facilitate every 
aspect of cognition.  
 
2.1 SELECTION PRESSURES ARGUMENT AGAINST DOMAIN-GENERALITY 
Accepting the precepts of EP seemingly entails that the human mind is exhaustively 
constituted by a collection of specialized modules, specialized in the sense of being domain-
specific with respect to adaptive activation conditions and representation outputs (Cosmides and 
Tooby 1997: 81). A corollary of this claim is that each selection pressure found in the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness calls for a specialized solution. What this precludes 
is the possibility that any domain-general mechanisms, such as a general-purpose learning 
system or problem solver, evolved to constitute a major part of the overall cognitive architecture. 
According to Cosmides and Tooby, “domain-specific cognitive mechanisms, with design 
features that exploit the stable structural features of evolutionarily recurring situations, can be 
expected to systematically outperform (and hence preclude or replace) more general 
mechanisms that fail to exploit these features” (1994: 90, my emphasis). In what follows, I 
describe what is meant by a domain-general cognitive mechanism, and then sketch Cosmides and 
Tooby’s argument – hereafter called the selection pressures argument – against there being such 
mechanisms comprising major aspects of human cognitive architecture, thereby reaffirming the 
inference from EP to MM.  
First off, how do we define what is meant by domain-generality, setting aside for the moment 
its connection to modularity criteria? Buller (2006) describes this characteristic as any sort of 
reasoning mechanism that follows generally applicable rules and algorithms to form beliefs and 
inferences across various cognitive databases (151-2). Features diametrically opposed to that of a 
14 
cognitive module typify such a mechanism: it would be (a) domain-general, (b) unencapsulated, 
and (c) flexible.  
Starting with (a), to describe the operations of domain-general processing, Buller (2006) 
draws on Popper’s model of hypothesis testing and refutation, applied outside the context of 
evaluating scientific theories, as a helpful metaphor (153). Just as any observation from 
unbounded domains of knowledge may potentially be related to, or may either confirm or 
disconfirm, a given hypothesis, any given belief may likewise be related to any other belief in the 
cognitive database. Consider the flexible operations of central cognition that would result from 
this capacity. If I believe that the plants in my garden will grow more quickly if I plant them far 
from the shade cast by the tree in my backyard, I draw on my various databases, including my 
knowledge about botany (e.g. to identify the optimal growth conditions of the sort of plant I plan 
to grow), geography (e.g. to determine whether growing the plant outside the shade matches the 
hospitable climate conditions from wherever it’s indigenous), and the intersection of physics and 
biology (e.g. to recognize that radiation from sunlight is a source of energy for inducing 
photosynthesis), to generate beliefs and propositional attitudes to which inference rules may 
subsequently be applied (Fodor 1983: 105). Some philosophers describe this relation holding 
among knowledge domains as being “inferentially promiscuous” in the sense that any one belief 
can be combined with any other belief in the database to form inferences in higher-order thought 
processes (Evans 1982; Brewer 1999; Hurley 2006). Because such processes draw on such a 
wide variety of databases to make inferential connections, it appears that general rules of 
reasoning govern central cognition. 
To provide an example of one such domain-general rule of reasoning, I may reflect on my 
beliefs using the inferential structure of modus ponens – (1) P à Q, (2) P, therefore (3) Q. 
15 
However, in order to form the necessary inferences about my beliefs, the mechanisms involved 
must be (b) unencapsulated in its access to my cognitive database. This gives access to an 
unbounded supply of inputs for modus ponens inference operations. The same goes for the other 
inference rules governing central cognition. By drawing on the various informational domains, 
and with unbounded potential inputs with respect to content, a domain-general processor can 
systematically and recursively generate beliefs, reasoning procedures, and plans of action (Fodor 
1994). Just as I can reason that, (1) if the sun shines, my plants will grow, (2) the sun is shining, 
Tf (3) my plants will grow, I can also reason that, (1) If the sun’s light does not reach the plants, 
then there must be an obstruction blocking the sunlight (2) the sun’s light is not reaching the 
plants, Tf (3) there must be an obstruction blocking the sunlight. Rules of reasoning that govern 
central cognition need to have access to all cognitive databases to be effective.  
By effective, what we mean is that the domain-general, unbounded mechanism should 
facilitate (c) flexible processing. If the mechanism operates in accordance to domain-general 
rules of inference, and if its access to cognitive databases is unbounded in scope, it would also 
enable the chaining of inferences, the combination of conceptual domains to form complex 
thoughts, and other characteristics of central cognition (Fodor 2000). Suppose that I discover that 
my plants are not growing. The next step would be to figure out whether there is an obstruction, 
or whether the plants are not getting enough water, or perhaps whether the soil is unsuitable for 
the plant species. The possible follow-up inferences are numerous indeed, unbounded in fact, and 
I may follow up on any one of these hypotheses in any order I wish, and either initiate or 
terminate a path of task-relevant inferences at will (see Fodor 2000: 60-2, for more on the 
characteristics of domain-general cognition).  
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One example of non-MM cognitive architecture with domain-general mechanisms governing 
central cognition is central systems theory (Fodor 1983). Although central systems theory posits 
modules that mediate perceptual processing (Fodor 1983: 40-1), it comports with the basic 
framework of non-MM architectures with respect to central cognition. To facilitate belief 
fixation, abstract and abductive reasoning, and other putative domain-general learning and 
cognitive tasks, this approach adduces a non-modular central processor to govern central 
cognition (for more on domain-general architectures, see Elman et al. 1996; Karmiloff-Smith 
1992; Prinz 2006: 6-8; Quartz & Sejnowski 1997; Samuels 1998). See fig. 2 below for a 
simplified theoretical schema of non-modular cognitive architectures: 
 
 
Fig. 2: Theoretical Schema of Domain General, Non-Massively Modular Cognition 
Now, returning to the main thread of this paper, could some selection pressures, relevant 
perhaps to resource acquisition or threat avoidance, have induced the evolution of a domain-
general mechanism in our cognitive architecture? Do the explanatory principles of EP favor 
Diagramed above is a simplified schema of the order of information processing within the non-MM approach to cognitive 
architecture. Note that peripheral systems like perception may be governed by mechanisms that satisfy the conditions for 
modularity. So the alternative to massively modular architectures may concede that some mechanisms are modular, while 
reserving central cognition for non-modular mechanisms (cf. Fodor 1983, 2000). Diagram taken from Nettle (2007: 261). 
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domain-general, non-MM architectures, such as a Fodorian central systems model (1983), or do 
they favor MM architectures?  
We turn now to the selection pressures argument against the possibility that a domain-
general mechanism governing central cognition could have evolved (Cosmides & Tooby 1997). 
They note that EP formulates hypotheses about highly specific selection pressures in the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness to explain the etiology of cognitive mechanisms. For 
a domain-general cognitive processor to emerge, there must have been a selection pressure our 
hunter-gatherer ancestors must have encountered via recurrent adaptive problems that would 
have selected for a domain-general solution. However, according to Cosmides and Tooby 
(1994), there are no general adaptive problems, only specific problems that call for specialized 
(i.e., domain-specific) solutions. As Symons put it, “There is no such thing as a ‘general problem 
solver’ because there is no such thing as a general problem” (1992: 142, my emphasis). For 
adaptive mechanisms to emerge in the cognitive mind the selection pressures must be stable 
environmental features, such that the investment costs associated with generating the new 
mechanism being offset by fitness-enhancing payoff makes the adaptation’s emergence and 
retention across phylogenetic history more likely (Tooby & Cosmides 1987: 53). Such stable 
selection pressures span across various domains, including the problems of resource acquisition, 
avoiding predation, and finding mates. For a domain-general mechanism to evolve, one must 
propose that the relevant selection pressure in question is something as general in scope as 
survival, something general enough to call for a general-purpose mechanism. But such an 
abstract category of selection pressure would be nowhere near fine-grained enough to constitute 
a recurrent environmental structure that would select for a particular adaptive structure (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1987: 53, footnote), nor is it a tractable enough for incremental adaptive traits to 
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overcome it (Cosmides & Tooby 1994). Besides, Cosmides and Tooby show elsewhere (1992) 
how all (or nearly all) the facets of central cognition can be readily accounted for by specialized 
adaptations. The following are viable candidates: 
A face recognition module, a spatial relations module, a rigid object mechanics module, 
tool-use module, a fear module, a social-exchange module, an emotion-perception module, a 
kin-oriented motivational module, an effort allocation and recalibration module, a child-care 
module, a social inference module, a sexual-attraction module, a semantic inference module, 
a friendship module, a grammar acquisition module, a communication-pragmatics module, a 
theory-of-mind module, and so on. (113)  
And that’s just to name a few of the many hundreds of thousands of domain-specific 
modules that govern central cognition in our cognitive architecture (Cosmides & Tooby 1995: 
xiii). Sperber adds that even conceptual reasoning governed by logical rules of inference, 
including the putative exemplars of domain generality like modus ponens, should be considered 
modules (2004: 56, footnote). This makes a compelling case for the MM thesis, because modus 
ponens inference looks like a paradigmatically domain-general process. Would there be a 
separate modus ponens module for each cognitive database – one for resource acquisition, one 
for predator avoidance, another for mate selection – for how else could modus ponens inferences 
be regarded as domain specific? Here is the reply. Modus ponens inferences are still domain 
specific since the input conditions are narrowly constrained to pairs of premises that conform to 
the general structure {(1) P, (2) [if P then Q]}, and this procedure need not draw on the actual 
content of different databases. According to Sperber (2004),  
[…] The difference between a wholly general and the number-specific modus ponens is 
one of inputs, and therefore of domain-specificity, not one of database, and therefore not 
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of encapsulation […] In particular, they ignore data that might cause a rational agent to 
refrain from performing the modus ponens and to question one or other of the premises 
instead (Harman 1986). If there is a modus ponens inference procedure in the human 
mind, it is better viewed, I would argue, as a cognitive reflex. (56, footnote, my emphasis, 
to explicitly tie the passage to the three conditions of modularity) 
Sperber has therefore clarified how a putatively domain-general process like modus 
ponens inferences could be (1) domain-specific, (2) encapsulated, and (3) mandatory in 
operation. Mutatis mutandis for the other inference systems that comprise central cognition. And 
if each module in central cognition corresponds to a selection pressure found in the Environment 
of Evolutionary Adaptedness, then MM is the most plausible cognitive architecture that 
conforms to the principles of EP. So goes the selection pressures argument. 
 
3 ENDOGENOUS PRESSURES AND NEURAL NETWORKS 
In this section, I will set the background for developing a rebuttal of Cosmides and Tooby’s 
selection pressures argument. I will contend that the selection pressures argument crucially relies 
on an overly restrictive construal of the term selection pressure. To do so, I will introduce a 
distinction between endogenous and exogenous selection pressures, followed by an elaboration 
on the differences between each type. In short, selection pressures external to the organism count 
as exogenous, whereas selection pressures stemming from internal factors of the organism itself, 
including its physiology, count as endogenous.9 Next, I will argue that exogenous pressures tend 
                                                
9	I hasten to acknowledge that this distinction is not completely novel. Godfrey-Smith (2010), in his review of What 
Darwin Got Wrong, points out how Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) describe how the internal structure of the 
organism plays a role in determining which adaptations emerge – these may be construed as endogenous pressures. 
Be that as it may, the way I apply the terms exogenous and endogenous selective in the adaptationist explanation of 
cognitive architecture that follows is not widely represented in the philosophy of cognitive science literature, nor in 
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to give rise to domain-specific sub-systems. At the end of the section, I argue that endogenous 
selection pressures gave rise to neural network structures called a rich club/ hub core that 
maintains a balance between functional integration of domain-specific sub-systems and 
metabolic efficiency.  
First, I will begin with the distinction between exogenous and endogenous selective 
pressures. Exogenous pressures refer to problems impinging from the external Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptedness in which ancestral organisms of a species were embedded, the same 
context that EP theorists, such as Cosmides and Tooby, employ in their explanatory framework. 
Examples of such adaptive problems may be found in any environmental feature external to the 
organism, but also impinge on the organism’s survival and reproductive viability. As was 
discussed in sections 2 and 2.1, exogenous selection pressures encompass the familiar problems 
posed by, inter alia, cooperative and rivalrous interaction with conspecifics, acquisition of 
resources, and avoiding predation. These selection pressures shaped many of the traits and 
features that eventually achieved fixation, meaning that these traits were retained throughout 
phylogenetic history, and are still expressed in the phenotypes of modern humans (Tooby & 
Cosmides 2005: 22). For example, the exogenous selection pressure posed by detecting moving 
objects may have selected for cognitive mechanisms (some of which being domain-specific) that 
aided in the detection of dangerous predators, or for facilitating the acquisition of potential 
sources of nourishment. Such a mechanism may very well correspond to some sort of domain-
specific mechanism, aptly called an animacy-detection system (Caramazza, A., & Shelton, J. 
1998).  
                                                                                                                                                       
mainstream evolutionary psychology. The distinction’s novel status notwithstanding, I will attempt to argue for the 
explanatory benefits of distinguishing endogenous and exogenous pressures.	
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Conceive of the domain-specific mechanisms in cognitive architecture as relatively localized 
neural networks – call these “hubs” or “sub-systems” (van den Heuvel et al. 2012). Sub-systems 
are defined in terms of domain-specificity, and should be understood as specialized networks that 
respond to narrowly constrained inputs. It bears repeating that some sub-systems may satisfy the 
conditions for being modular: such sub-systems would instantiate cognitive functions that are (1) 
domain-specific in the sense of having narrowly constrained activation conditions and produce a 
restricted range of representations; (2) encapsulated by having access to only their own 
proprietary databases; and (3) operate mandatorily by responding automatically to received 
inputs. The network hubs corresponding to modules enable cost-efficient, in terms of being 
metabolically cheap, solutions to adaptive problems recurrent in the external environment. 
 
Fig. 3: Exogenous Pressures Select for Domain-Specific Sub-Systems 
It is of little concern to my overall thesis whether some of these domain-specific 
networks turn out to be modules. My specific target is the MM cognitive architecture, which 
leaves room for there being some, perhaps even many, mechanisms that satisfy conditions for 
modularity. My target is the stronger MM thesis that modules constitute the entire cognitive 
Sub-system, or hub, organization enables the formation of specialized neural communities. Density of connections is 
generally greater within a community than between communities. Computational studies suggest additional advantages of 
specialized organization: modular networks deal more effectively with the increased processing demands imposed by 
variable environments modularity confers a degree of resilience against dynamic perturbations and small variations in 
structural connectivity (taken from Box 3, “Communities, cores, and rich clubs,” from Bullmore and Sporns 2012: 342).  
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architecture, and especially central cognition. To successfully undermine MM, it will suffice to 
point out the aspects of cognitive architecture primarily concerned with central cognition are 
governed by non-modular mechanisms. 
My approach to developing a non-MM cognitive architecture stems from endogenous 
selection pressures. Endogenous selection pressures refer to adaptive problems imposed by the 
organism’s own intrinsic physiology. Some internal structural arrangement of various 
mechanisms and sub-systems within the organism may present a host of potential impediments 
to survival and reproduction (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 352). On the dimension of metabolic 
efficiency, it was proposed by Rosch (1978: 3) that a viable cognitive architecture is constrained 
by the general principle of cognitive economy, the challenge of maximizing information about 
the environment while conserving finite resources. For instance, internal systems that are 
unsuitably structured or maladaptively arranged can impede metabolic efficiency or disrupt the 
inter-dependent coordinated activity of cognitive sub-systems (Sporns 2011: 127-8).  Moreover, 
sub-optimal structural arrangements and maladaptive integration of different mechanisms could 
impede fitness-enhancing functions from otherwise emerging, perhaps due to restrictions 
imposed by metabolic inefficiency, which leads to diminished survival and reproductive viability 
in the long run (Godfrey-Smith 2013: 53). Without integrative mechanisms in place, the 
computational demands imposed by specialized cognitive sub-systems during evolution of the 
brain would impose deleterious metabolic inefficiencies, translated into wiring costs in network 
terms (Sporns 2011; Chklovskii & Koulakov 2004; Kaiser & Hilgetag 2006), and the second 
problem of over-segregation of processing systems would impede functional performance in 
central cognition (Bullmore & Sporns 2012). De Reus and van den Heuvel (2014: 2) further 
clarify the second problem when they point out that, without the structural interconnectivity of 
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anatomically distinct processing systems, the global exchange of information essential to higher-
order cognitive processes would be compromised. 
The modern brain is a suitable model for illustrating how adaptations responsive to 
endogenous pressures emerged and persisted during its evolutionary development. The 
explanation for how network hubs get interconnected in certain predictable patterns and why 
some hubs became highly interconnected is not to be found in the Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptiveness of hunter-gatherer ancestors. To find the appropriate explanatory context, one must 
look the properties of the internal organization of the evolving brain.10 To secure fully the 
distinction between endogenous and exogenous pressures, the evolving hominid brain in the 
Pleistocene acquired additional specialized sub-systems (viz. the exogenous selection process), 
with the addition of those sub-systems imposing stricter metabolic demands further selecting for 
the metabolically efficient variations of interconnected brain structure (viz. the endogenous 
selection process). 
Incorporating the notion of endogenous pressures into models of cognitive architecture helps 
to illuminate findings from Bullmore and Sporns’ (2012) account of cognitive economy in brain 
network topology. With the aim of identifying the selection pressures that shaped the precise 
organization of neural structures, their analysis uncovered the network structures that relay 
outputs between networks and efficiently process information to facilitate central cognition 
(2012: 338). Throughout the evolutionary history of the human connectome, referring to the total 
number of network connections in the brain, there were two competing mandates of minimizing 
metabolic and wiring cost while retaining efficient information flow constitutes an endogenous 
                                                
10	Locating the etiology of cognitive mechanisms solely in features of the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness 
reflects an externalist perspective, whereas an explanation in terms of the intrinsic properties of cognition stems 
from an internalist orientation. See Godfrey-Smith (1996: 30-65) for a discussion of the distinction between 
externalist and internalist orientations to explaining properties of cognition.		
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selection pressure that favored mechanisms whose role is to strike a balance between the two 
demands (Sporns 2013; Sporns 2012: 347; Sporns 2011: 134-9).  
The human brain is replete with sub-systems and sub-routines that carry out functions that 
accomplish specific ends (think of memory sub-systems, vision and audition processors, 
language faculties, etc.). If during the course of evolutionary development, the brain gradually 
accreted domain-specific sub-systems, a commensurate wiring cost would follow each new 
addition, simultaneously leading to the expansion of cortical volume along with increasing 
metabolic costs. Concurrent with wiring and metabolic costs, the accretion of different sub-
systems concurrently brought along adaptive problems of functional coordination and integration 
(Bullmore & Sporns 2012: 336). Indeed, to function properly each sub-system, corresponding to 
additional network hubs, had to be integrated by dedicated structures whose proprietary 
functions would include, at a minimum, performance of the requisite computational tasks to 
efficiently relay outputs among the vast multitudes of sub-systems (Sporns & Bullmore 2010; 
2012: 336). In other words, these endogenous pressures – metabolic cost and functional 
integration of additional network hubs – would have selected for mechanisms whose basic 
functional repertoire was geared toward coordinating and integrating activity among the sub-
systems.  
This line of reasoning satisfies the parameters set by the selection pressures argument from 
Cosmides and Tooby (1997). Recall that the objection stems from the observation that there must 
be stable, recurrent adaptive problems inherent in the environment for adaptive mechanisms to 
emerge. The endogenous pressures adduced above do constitute stable, recurrent adaptive 
problems in the environment; only in this case the relevant environmental context is the 
topological and integrative arrangement of specialized hubs in the connectome. De Reus and van 
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den Heuvel (2014: 1) define the connectome as “the complex network of all neural elements and 
neural connections of an organism that provides the anatomical foundations for emerging 
dynamic functions.” Another way to put it is either the Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptiveness needs to take into account the intrinsic physiological organization of the organism, 
or if partisans of EP like Cosmides and Tooby insist on the strictly externalist construal, then the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness remains an inadequate explanatory device for some 
structures in cognitive architecture. 
The two stable, recurrent pressures in the internal organismal system are metabolic cost and 
functional integration of sub-systems. By reverse engineering the connective properties of brain 
networks, one may infer the emergence of structures whose functional role is to mitigate 
metabolic cost and facilitate functional efficiency (Sporns & Bullmore 2010; 2012: 343). In the 
space of possible permutations of network hub organization, there are differences in fitness-value 
along the two dimensions of functional capacity and metabolic efficiency (van den Heuvel et al. 
2012; Sporns 2013). Studies of the particular topological arrangement of neural networks within 
the human brain have uncovered exemplars of fitness-enhancing permutations. Liang et al. 
(2017) recently conducted network analyses and discovered that some permutations of network 
connectivity minimize metabolic cost – measured in terms of cerebral blood flow – while 
maintaining functional efficiency in cognition.  
The balance between these two pressures can be viewed as a sort of functional and metabolic 
homeostasis. Both endogenous pressures selected for network structures that could effectively 
maintain the homeostatic balance between functional integration and metabolic efficiency 
(Sporns 2013). The following are two such adaptive mechanisms in brain networks that facilitate 
the homeostatic role: the “rich club” and “hub core” (Bullmore and Sporns 2012: 342). The 
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topologically centrally located “rich club” is a place of intersection among hub sub-systems 
where the highest levels of interconnectivity among hubs have been measured (van de Heuvel et 
al. 2012). In particular, sub-system connections traversing the greatest distance within the 
connectome tend to link up with the rich club (Bullmore & Sporns 2012: 343). 
 
 Fig. 4: Endogenous Pressures Select for Rich Club 
 
 
 
Nested within the rich club is a sub-component called the “hub core” which creates more 
centralized linkages across distant sub-system hubs (Sporns & Bullmore 2010; 2012: 342). The 
hub core’s function is to implement information flow across the topologically distal sub-systems.  
 
 Fig. 5: Endogenous Pressures Select for Hub Core 
Densely interconnected regions within sub-system hubs correspond to rich clubs that assist in efficient 
information flow. Distal connections in the rich club are metabolically expensive, suggesting an important 
functional and integrative role to offset the metabolic investment costs by the organism (from Box 3, 
“Communities, cores, and rich clubs,” from Bullmore and Sporns 2012: 342) 
Inter-modular connector hubs occupy a topologically more central or potential ‘bottleneck’ role between networks. 
An integrated core of densely inter-connected hubs has a central role in generating globally efficient information 
flow and integration (from Box 3, “Communities, cores, and rich clubs,” from Bullmore and Sporns 2012: 342). 
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With suitable adaptive solutions to endogenous selection pressures in hand, how do these rich 
club and hub core structures enable homeostatic functions, and how could their intrinsic 
functionality map onto cognitive architecture?  
 
4 MODULAR SOLUTIONS TO ENDOGENOUS PRESSURES 
Inferring features of cognitive architecture from neural network models raises the question of 
whether rich clubs and hub cores should be regarded as modular systems, comporting with the 
MM thesis. Even if partisans of MM grant that there are endogenous pressures, and that 
Bullmore and Sporns (2012) have accurately identified the functional role of the rich clubs and 
hub cores, the circumscribed functional properties of these network structures may nonetheless 
satisfy the three conditions for modularity. A modular solution to endogenous pressures (i.e., the 
homeostatic goal of mitigating metabolic cost while functionally integrating sub-systems within 
the brain [Sporns 2011: 142]) would be (1) domain-specific, (2) encapsulated, (3) operationally 
mandatory cognitive mechanisms, reinforcing the claim that MM architectures supply a 
satisfactory solution to endogenous pressures. 
Proponents of MM might argue that the functionality of rich club/hub core need not extend 
beyond that of a control system/switchyard. A mechanism acting as a control system/switchyard 
would be an information-exchange channel that feeds information to different interconnected 
sub-systems without necessarily processing those inputs. The actual processing of 
representations in central cognition would take place in the different sub-systems, rather than in 
the rich club per se. If the rich club/hub core is really just a switchyard, then proponents of MM 
could claim that these topologically central structures satisfy the three conditions of modularity. 
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In that case, the rich club and hub core could be regarded as a specialized module that subserves 
mundane metabolic and information trafficking tasks.11  
The (1) proper domain would correspond to the retrieving and delivering of outputs between 
the hub sub-systems via the rich club/hub core. By parity of reasoning with respect to exogenous 
selection pressures, homeostatic regulation would count as a recurrent endogenous selection 
pressure calling for a specialized modular solution. A modular system would take the outputs 
from multitudes of specialized hubs competing with one another for metabolic resources, and 
would allocate resources to relevant sub-systems by monitoring the cognitive task at hand 
(Sperber 2004: 61-2). To illustrate this procedure, suppose sub-system A is capable of delivering 
outputs that satisfy the activation conditions of sub-system B (i.e., the representational outputs 
delivered from A fall within the proper domain and database of B). The rich club/hub core Z is 
the switchyard from A to B. We should regard the proper domain of Z to be the retrieval of 
outputs from A in order to send those outputs to B. This scenario illustrates how the rich 
club/hub core would satisfy modularity condition (1). 
If rich clubs and hub cores are (2) encapsulated, they would still fulfill their homeostatic role 
by having a strictly circumscribed database to which it has access, and the other cognitive 
systems would lack access to the rich club/hub core database. Returning to the above scenario, 
rich club/hub core Z would be encapsulated in the sense of having access only to the databases of 
hubs A and B, but not to the other sub-systems, and other sub-systems would not have access to 
rich club/hub core Z’s database. And this seems plausible if Z really is just a switchyard that 
relays outputs between A and B. It would not need to have access to a wider range of cognitive 
                                                
11	Carruthers (2006), for instance, proposes that the language content-integrator, and on Sperber’s account (1994, 
2000) the metarepresentational module, correspond to higher-order modules that traffic information across 
subordinate module databases.	
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databases to function accordingly. This scenario demonstrates how the rich club/hub core 
satisfies modularity condition (2). 
The rich clubs and hub cores would also need to be (3) mandatory in operation to count as a 
modular system. Returning to Sperber’s description, “a procedure is mandatory if, given the 
appropriate input, it will follow its course and produce its output whatever the rest of the 
cognitive mind is doing” (2004: 6). Returning to the scenario once again, the “cognitive reflex” 
description (Sperber 2002; 2004) would accurately describe the procedures followed by rich 
club/hub core Z after it receives information from sub-system A. It does not need to perform 
complex operations on the representations it receives from A in order to act as a switchyard. To 
carry out its operations efficiently, Z operates automatically upon receiving outputs from A and 
promptly sends the information to sub-system B. The processing of those outputs take place in 
modular systems further downstream in central cognition. Thus, the rich club/hub core satisfies 
modularity condition (3). 
As illustrated in the above scenario, if the rich club/hub core is no more than a switchyard, 
then its functional properties would satisfy the three modularity conditions. A fortiori, there is no 
need to posit a domain-general mechanism (pace non-MM architectures) to overcome 
endogenous selection pressures. Domain-general mechanisms would be rendered superfluous if 
there is a viable modular solution to endogenous selection pressures. Therefore, EP should favor 
the MM thesis even with respect to endogenous pressures. 
 
5 ENDOGENOUS PRESSURES SELECT FOR DOMAIN-GENERALITY 
In response to the defense of MM from section 4, I will argue that the functional properties of 
rich clubs and hub cores go beyond that of a switchyard, and cannot satisfy the three modularity 
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conditions. In addition to the homeostatic function introduced in section 3, I will argue that the 
rich club/ hub core also integrates representations in order to facilitate central cognition. On this 
account, then, the central cognition functions of rich clubs and hub cores are conceptualized as 
an exaptation, an adaptive mechanism that was coopted to serve additional functions beyond its 
original homeostatic function. I will show how a topologically central placement ideally 
positions the rich club/hub core to serve as the underpinning of belief fixation, analogical 
reasoning, and other features of higher-order thought in central cognition. The upshot is: in virtue 
of its structural interconnectivity to different sub-systems, the rich club/hub core is best suited to 
facilitating the computational tasks involved in central cognition. 
There is ample evidence of adaptive functional characteristics facilitated by these network 
structures that modules are unlikely to manifest. This would especially be the case if the two 
functions of homeostatic regulation and processor in central cognition are complementary and 
instantiated by the same mechanism. Furthermore, if the rich club/hub core facilitates a manifold 
of central cognitive processes, the mechanism looks less like a module than a central system that 
is (a) domain-general, (b) unencapsulated, (c) operationally flexible. To argue for this conclusion 
will require examination of different strands of evidence from brain imaging studies focusing on 
the functional properties of the rich club/hub core in central cognition.  
With the homeostatic adaptive role of the rich club/hub core already in hand, we will explore 
how rich clubs and hub cores facilitate central cognition. To argue for these structures being a 
processor in central cognition, rather than a mere switchyard, the topologically centralized 
location of rich clubs and hub cores is suggestive of a viable background trait for central 
cognition. Higher-order cognitive functions, like belief fixation and abstract reasoning, were late 
emerging compared to perception and attention (Fodor 1983: 43). And, according to Anderson 
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and Penner-Wilger, “the later something emerges, the more potentially useful existing circuitry 
there will be” (2013: 44). The processes of central cognition were among the latest to evolve, and 
the existing circuitry of the rich club/hub core could have gradually added on central cognitive 
capacities. The most plausible analogues in neural network models to central cognition systems 
would be those mechanisms that are optimally positioned to retrieve outputs from 
interconnected, specialized sub-systems. If it could be established that complex processing of 
information takes place within the rich club/hub core, then it would be highly suggestive of an 
integral role in central cognition. Fodor anticipated such a proposal in his seminal work, The 
Modularity of Mind: 
Input analyzers [and modules], with their […] relatively rigid domain specificity and 
automaticity of functioning, are the aboriginal prototypes of inference-making psychological 
systems. Cognitive evolution would thus have been in the direction of gradually freeing 
certain sorts of problem-solving systems from the constraints under which input analyzers 
[modules] labor – hence of producing, as a relatively late achievement, the comparatively 
domain-free inferential capacities which apparently mediate the higher flights of cognition. 
(1983: 43, my emphasis) 
One presumes Fodor would disavow a Darwinian, or adaptationist, reading of the passage 
above (see Fodor. & Piattelli-Palmarini [2010]), but it nonetheless anticipates the idea that 
exaptational properties of central cognition could have been built by opening up pathways of 
interconnectivity among specialized sub-systems that were originally anatomically (and 
functionally) segregated. Recall from section 3 that the original homeostatic role of the rich 
club/hub core was made feasible by anatomically interlinking disparate sub-systems. We can 
read Fodor’s reference to unlocked “constraints” under which domain-specific sub-system labor 
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as just the sort of exaptational re-purposing of the rich club/hub core requisite for central 
cognition. Following a similar line of thought, Mithen (1996) described the evolutionary event 
leading to central cognition as a semi-breakdown in strict segregation between specialized 
cognitive sub-systems. Whereas mere structural integration would be sufficient for maintaining 
metabolic efficiency (by shortening communication distances between nodes, with each node 
corresponding to cortical sub-systems [van den Heuvel et al. 2012: 11372]), but global, 
functional integration of different sub-systems is prerequisite for central cognition (Cocchi et al. 
2014). The capacity for functional integration amounts to the capacity for combining contents 
from different databases into more complex representations, an important precondition for 
compositional thought (Fodor 1994; Fodor & Lepore 1996). The additional (i.e., exaptational) 
functional integration would have followed later in evolutionary history at the locus of structural 
interconnectivity among sub-systems. Indeed, for central cognition to get off the ground, “there 
must be relatively nondenominational (i.e., domain-inspecific) psychological systems which 
operate, inter alia, to exploit the information that input systems provide” (Fodor 1983: 103). 
Following Fodor’s reasoning, the rich club/hub core broke down the functional constraints under 
which specialized sub-systems operated, creating the potential for pulling contents from the 
different sub-systems to execute computations that form beliefs, make inferences, and perform 
other central cognitive tasks.  
The contentious claim most in need of defense is that homeostatic regulation and central 
cognition are complementary traits instantiated by the same mechanism. Here is the defense. The 
genetic variants that exhibited the rich club/hub core enjoyed the fitness advantage imparted by 
metabolic efficiency. However, the adaptive value of the trait would have compounded 
considerably if it imparted functional properties as well. Recall that the functional properties of 
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central cognition include the composition of complex thoughts involved in analogical reasoning 
and belief fixation. To draw a variety of inferences and create analogical relations, these central 
cognition tasks must draw on multitudes of informational realms and databases contained in the 
sub-systems (Weiskopf 2014:17). The rich club/hub core would be the mechanism that is 
suitably interconnected to draw on these different databases. Due to being densely 
interconnected to other sub-systems (Baggio et al. 2015), the rich club/hub core would be best 
positioned to pull from different databases and facilitate central cognition.  
If the foregoing inference from structural integration to centrality to functional integration 
holds, then the functional properties of the rich club/hub core would be twofold: (A) homeostatic 
regulation of metabolic resources (Sporns & Bullmore 2010; 2012: 337), but (B) facilitating 
central cognition. The latter role would include, inter alia, drawing on different database and 
applying computational rules that integrate concepts, compose beliefs, form inferences, and carry 
out complex sequences of goal-directed action. Fig. 6 below illustrates the compounding fitness 
benefits offered by a complementary relation between properties (A) and (B): 
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Fig. 6: Adaptive Value of Complimentary Homeostatic and Central Cognition Roles 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Fig. 6 above, some adaptive traits compound their fitness value if they occur 
together interdependently (Schulz 2008: 737), rather than being "bolted on" separately as distinct 
traits to different mechanisms (to use Carruthers' wording [2008:300]). Take for instance the 
widely observed phenomenon of neural reuse: the cortical region of pre-existing neural circuitry 
becomes re-purposed in order to facilitate a wider variety of functions (Anderson & Penner-
Wilger 2013). Here is a useful analogy from biology: feathers originally evolved for thermal 
regulation, which were reassigned to flight capacities or to signaling among conspecifics 
(Persons & Currie 2015). Feathers confer compounded adaptive benefit by overlaying a 
Assign the two properties of functional integration/metabolic homeostasis and central cognition to T1 
and T2 respectively. The three ratios represented as IB1, IB2, and IB3 represent phenotypic 
permutations wherein T1 and T2 vary independently, translated into fitness benefits tied to the 
presence of one at the cost of fitness detriments by the comparative absence of the other trait. 
Complimentary homeostasis such that changes in T1 induce changes in T2 (and vice versa) endows 
the greatest adaptive value, represented in the dashed linear slope (taken from Schulz [2008: 737]). 
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multitude of distinct functions. It is not uncommon to observe mechanisms take on functions that 
diverge from older, etiological functions (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 320). Likewise, 
mechanisms in the mind could have followed an analogous pattern of "jury-rigging" additional 
functions of central cognition on pre-existing structures to impart additional adaptive benefits. 
Revisiting the concept of exaptation, some functions occur via reconfiguration of existing brain 
circuitry or assignment to pre-existing structures of additional functions. The appearance of 
additional functions need not co-occur with the addition of new, specialized sub-systems 
(Anderson & Penner-Wilger 2012). Functions (A) and (B) – respectively, homeostatic regulation 
and central cognition processing – would impart additional fitness benefits if they are 
complimentary traits (i.e., if they are instantiated by the same mechanism). In fact, if traits (A) 
and (B) were bolted onto different mechanisms, these traits may have actually imposed more 
fitness costs than benefits. Consider the metabolic costs carried by (B). If (B) appeared before 
(A), then the metabolic costs imposed by such brain organization would result in net-negative 
fitness. If too metabolically costly, there would have been selection against the emergence of 
(B). By parity of reasoning, a mechanism that instantiates (A) by breaking down constraints of 
processing and desegregates specialized sub-systems without active participation in the 
processing of those representational outputs would confer far less adaptive value than an 
alternative mechanism that could integrate information.  
But why think (A) and (B) are complementary traits inhering in a single mechanism rather 
than their corresponding to separate modular systems? Defenders of MM would not be 
convinced. The MM architecture would regard (A) and (B) as distinct rather than complementary 
traits. However, the MM model would need to posit not only a module for (A), but also an 
additional module for (B). And it doesn’t stop there, for MM regards central cognition as 
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composed of multitudes of separate modules. Recall that the MM thesis posits a multiplicity of 
modules specialized for each informational domain in the cognitive database: separate modules 
for mate selection, cheater detection, face recognition, and so on, with each new module 
evolving independently of one another. So exogenous pressures selected for each central 
cognition module. But then each central cognition module had to be structurally and functionally 
integrated with the prior modules, given the wiring and metabolic costs imposed by its addition 
to the connectome. So there would have been a separate endogenous selection process in favor of 
the integration of each additional module into the existing architecture. But how does each 
cognitive module emerge without imposing too great a metabolic cost, and how does the 
homeostatic regulator module emerge before the additional cognitive modules appear? The 
presence of cognitive modules imposed the very endogenous pressure that selected for the 
homeostatic regulator in the first place. A more pressing question is which selection process – 
between the endogenous and exogenous – drives the other, and how would the MM framework 
begin to resolve these question? 
 I propose a defense of the more parsimonious explanation on offer from the non-MM thesis. 
A central system would facilitate both (A) and (B). The functional properties of central cognition 
scaled up incrementally as the structural interconnectivity of sub-systems via the rich club/ hub 
core increased over of the course of evolutionary development of the brain. The structural 
interconnectivity of specialized sub-systems was a precondition for the commensurate scaling up 
central cognition capacities.12 Cortical volume, and computational capacity, would have also 
increased allometrically as the density and volume of neural network inter-connectivity increased 
throughout the phylogenetic history of the human brain (Herculano-Houzel 2016). The product 
                                                
12	What needs to be determined is whether this commensurate scaling up of integration and cognitive complexity is 
a linear or non-linear relationship.	While I do not address such concerns here, these details could be uncovered 
through further investigation and development of this non-MM cognitive architecture.  
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turned out to be a hierarchically structured cognitive architecture that strikes a balance between 
(A) homeostatic regulation of metabolic resources and (B) computational power in central 
cognition (Barrett 2012). Both of these properties, (A) and (B), inhere in the rich club/hub core. 
The evolutionarily prior property of structural integration comes from interlinking disparate sub-
systems, shortening communication pathway length and securing (A) metabolic homeostasis. But 
through the reuse of neural mechanisms (Anderson & Penner-Wilger 2013), the structures 
facilitating the foregoing functions could take on additional, exaptational functions relevant to 
(B) central cognition. Note that I am not arguing that a non-MM cognitive architecture evolved 
because it is the most efficient and the most parsimonious. Many evolved mechanisms are not 
the most effective conceivable solutions to selection pressures (cf. Barrett 2015: 78). Rather, the 
argument is that complementary relation between (A) homeostatic regulator and (B) central 
cognition processor constitutes a parsimonious solution to endogenous pressures that also 
comports with recent evidence from the cognitive sciences, particularly from brain mapping and 
imaging methodologies. These strands of evidence converge on the non-MM thesis, or so I will 
argue.  
There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that rich clubs and hub cores actively 
participate in the actual processing and integration of information from different hub sub-
systems (see Zamora-Lòpez et al. 2009; Bullmore and Sporns 2012; van den Heuvel et al. 2012). 
These strands of evidence support the conclusion that the rich club facilitates function (B) – that 
of central cognition – in accordance with a central system that is (a) domain general,                 
(b) unencapsulated, and (c) operationally flexible (viz. the central cognition features of non-MM 
architectures).  
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First, we must establish that the rich club/hub core is (a) domain-general. A study by 
Anderson & Pessoa (2011) revealed the task diversity of interconnected cortical regions across a 
broad range of cognitive tasks relating to language semantics, reasoning, semantic memory, and 
working memory. While measuring the functional diversity of 78 different cortical regions from 
0 to 1 (i.e., the closer to 1, the more diverse the functional role of that cortical region), Anderson 
& Pessoa (2011) determined that the average diversity of these regions was .70 in 1,138 
experimental tasks across 11 different cognitive BrainMap task domains, including explicit 
(semantic) memory, reasoning, language semantics and working memory (see Fox et al. [2005] 
for more on BrainMap task domains). Another study by Kitzbichler et al. (2011) uncovered a 
negative correlation between clustered, modular processing and cognitive effort – especially in 
working memory tasks associated with central cognition – and positive correlation with “more 
globally efficient” configuration of processing. This analysis reveals functionally integrated, 
rather than a segregated, processing of cortical regions in central cognition tasks.  
These functionally integrated cortical regions correspond to the rich club/hub core, as 
evidenced by a study done by Shine et al. (2016: 6) which found that this mechanism integrates 
representational outputs from different sub-systems across central cognition tasks, including 
abstract reasoning and belief formation. One may refer to this characteristic as a high 
participation index, meaning that the rich club/hub core participates across a wide range of 
cognitive tasks associated with global processing of information in central cognition (Bullmore 
& Sporns 2012: 342). The rich club/hub core structure is no mere switchyard, as an information 
trafficking hub would not apply computational rules that integrate the representational outputs 
delivered from various informational domains.13 Uttal (2001) points to neuroimaging findings 
                                                
13 Another way to formulate the adaptive value of functional intergration in central cognition concerns the 
generality constraint, a principle originally formulated by Evans (1982). Take analogical reasoning for instance. The 
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that demonstrate vast integrated neural networks facilitate complex reasoning tasks, rather than 
heterogeneous, specialized sub-systems. Further analysis of dynamic network changes during 
cognitive control and complex reasoning tasks reveals that no one sub-system alone possesses 
the computational capacity to produce complex representational outputs of central cognition, 
except via its integration with other specialized sub-systems (Cocchi et al. 2013: 9).  
Taking the foregoing studies of the communication dynamics of functional integration into 
account, we evidence of domain-general cognition being facilitated by functional 
interconnectivity between sub-systems, rather than taking place in any one specialized sub-
                                                                                                                                                       
idea that analogical reasoning must be a component of domain-general cognition is partially based on the claim that 
the units of analogical thought, concepts, must conform to isotropy (Fodor 1983, 2000). The idea of isotropy is that 
any one of our propositional attitudes can be used to evaluate any other propositional attitude (Carruthers 2013a: 
144). Isotropy implies a certain sort of holism about conceptual belief systems, in the sense that propositions 
imbedded in any one belief could in fact be related to any other proposition. An example: my ASTRONOMY 
thoughts could be related to my BOTANY thoughts when I form a deductive inference like the following: “were the 
sun to suddenly become a red giant, the flowers in my garden would wither.” The upshot is that any given thought 
could potentially be related to any other thought. The generality constraint follows from isotropy. If I possess 
concepts F and a needed to entertain the thought Fa, and if I possess G and b required to entertain Gb, then I should 
be able to formulate the thoughts Fb and Ga.  
Suppose that central cognition really does exhibit isotropy and conforms to the generality constraint. To satisfy 
the generality constraint, the massive modularity framework faces the following dilemma: either (a) higher-order 
modules do not satisfy the generality constraint, or (b) higher-order modules do satisfy the generality constraint. 
Taking the first horn of the dilemma, if (a) higher-order modules do not satisfy the generality constraint, modules 
alone cannot impart the cognitive flexibility required to compose novel conceptual structures. Massive modularity 
would therefore fail to account for all features of central cognition (Weiskopf 2010: 19). To the second horn, if (b) 
higher-order modules satisfy the generality constraint, then it follows that the proper domains of these higher-order 
modules encompass the domains of all subordinate modules, so these modules would in fact be domain-general. 
Furthermore, the higher-order modules would have access to the databases of all sub-ordinate modules, so the 
higher-order modules would be unencapsulated. Therefore, on (b) massive modularity collapses into central systems 
theory, thereby relegating the distinction between ‘higher-order module’ and ‘central system’ to a trivial linguistic 
dispute (Weiskopf 2010: 15). If modular mechanisms do not adequately account for key features of central 
cognition, then the analogy between modules and the neural network rich clubs and hub cores fail to obtain.  
The sort of analogical reasoning on central systems theory that conforms to the generality constraint is 
predicated on mechanisms that are domain-general and unencapsulated. In order to combine content across 
conceptual domains, there must be a system that can receive multiple inputs and perform multiple functions 
simultaneously (hence, it must be domain-general), and be capable of ‘looking’ into different databases to compose 
unbounded, novel conceptual structures (hence, it must be unencapsulated). Therefore, since only the central system 
could satisfy the generality constraint. The benefits that follow from analogical reasoning would include tool 
construction (Mithen 1996) and category learning (Holyoak 2012), so it is not difficult to imagine the adaptive value 
enjoyed by a cognitive architecture that facilitates domain-general analogical reasoning capable of satisfying the 
generality constraint.  
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system (Cocchi et al. 2013: 9; Cole et al. 2013; Bola & Sabel 2015). These bodies of evidence 
therefore speak against the claim that processing of representations takes place within the 
“isolable, function-specific processing systems,” in reference to Carruthers’ sense of domain 
specificity (2006: 7). Perhaps these findings should not be surprising, given the processing 
constraints implied by the three conditions of modular conditions (i.e., (1) domain-specificity, (2) 
informational encapsulation, and (3) mandatory processing).  
To illustrate the functional advantages of the rich club/hub core cast as domain-general 
processor, return to the scenario involving rich club/hub core Z and output hubs A and B. 
Suppose hub A delivers outputs that are the proprietary inputs of hub B. If Z functionally 
integrates contents, then Z could apply computational procedures on the outputs of both A and B 
to generate complex, compositional thought characteristic of central cognition. If Z applies 
recursive rules of inference – like modus ponens – to its representational inputs across different 
content domains, then the rich club/ hub core would serve as an effective domain-general 
processor in central cognition. Switchyards do not possess the discriminative capacity to tease 
out combinatorial properties of the different representational outputs, for the property to process 
representations from multitudes of sub-system databases implies the capacity to read those 
representational inputs. Thus, if the rich club/hub core functionally integrates the 
representational inputs of interconnected sub-systems, this mechanism would be (a) domain 
general. 
In order for the rich club/ hub core to act as a domain general processor, it would also need to 
be (b) unencapsulated with respect to informational databases contained in sub-systems in order 
to facilitate central cognition. Assuming that the rich club/ hub cores unrestrictedly accesses the 
entire cognitive database, then this structure would be better able to apply domain-general rules 
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irrespective of the content domain. After measuring communication paths of sub-systems in the 
connectome, van den Heuvel et al. (2012: 11374) determined that 69% of communication paths 
pass through the rich club/hub core, indicating wide access to informational domains. A 
landmark study from Scannell et al. (1995) revealed that the rich club/hub core structure 
connects in cortical regions across a vast array of functional domains, including hub sub-systems 
undergirding fronto-limbic, visual, auditory, and somatosensory and motor regions. Evidence of 
the rich club/hub core access to different cognitive domains also comes from cross-species 
comparisons. Analogous structural and functional characteristics of rich club/ hub cores have 
been identified in comparisons between the cat cortex (Zamora-Lòpez et al. 2009, 2011), 
macaque cortex (Harriger et al. 2012), and the human cortex (van den Heuvel & Sporns 2011). 
What suggests that the rich club/ hub core is unencapsulated is the wide range of sub-systems 
from which information may be retrieved. Across all three species, these sub-systems include 
“occipital and parietal visual and sensory regions, temporal auditory regions, frontal (pre)motor 
regions, as well as insular, medioparietal, and mediofrontal regions overlapping the limbic 
system” (de Reus & van den Heuvel 2013). Tying these findings into the rich club/ hub core’s 
role in central cognition, counted among the requisite preconditions for higher-order cognitive 
processes in central cognition is unrestricted access to databases in order to furnish the mind with 
complex thoughts in reasoning and inference.  
Finally, the rich club/hub core is also a (c) flexible processor. The cortical regions specified 
above have been described as a collection of “multi-demand systems” (Fedorenko 2014: 4). The 
multi-demand system has been shown to play a processing role in “attention (Posner & Petersen 
1990; Desimone & Duncan 1995; Peterson & Posner 2012), working memory (Goldman-Rakic 
1995), cognitive control (Miller & Cohen 2001; Koechlin et al. 2003; Badre and D’Esposito 
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2009), structure building/unification (Hagoort 2005), timing and/or sequencing (Luria 1966; 
Janata and Grafton 2003; Fuster 2008), attentional episodes in goal-directed behavior (Duncan 
2010), and conscious awareness (Dehaene and Changeux 2011)” (cf. Fedorenko 2014: 4).14 Yue 
et al. (2017) and Cohen and D’Esposito (2016) found that modular processing and flexibility in 
higher-order cognitive performance are negatively coordinated, with inter-modular activity (i.e., 
rich club/ hub core) increasing scaling up commensurately with the complexity imposed by the 
cognitive task. Grayson et al (2014) determined that the rich club/hub core undergirds the fronto-
parietal network, which plays a role in deployment of attentional resources. One component of 
the fronto-parietal network, called the anterior insular cortex, imparts flexible processing by 
selecting relevant information across different modalities for entry into central cognition (Michel 
2017). These findings suggest that the rich club/hub core structure mediates task switching in 
central cognition, befitting an (c) operationally flexible, rather than mandatory, processor. With 
all three features of non-MM cognitive architecture in hand, we may conclude that the rich 
club/hub core corresponds to a (a) domain general, (b) unencapsulated, (c) operationally flexible 
processor in central cognition. 
In summary, the proposed intrinsic functionality of the rich club/hub core (i.e., the adaptive 
responses to endogenous pressures) engenders two complementary functions: (A) homeostatic 
regulation, and, (B) central cognition processor comporting with the three features of non-MM 
architectures: (a) domain-general, (b) unencapsulated, (c) flexible processor. 
Note that the structure of my response to the selection pressures objection is an inference of 
functional properties from structural properties. It is important to flag a lingering worry 
                                                
14	Connecting the present analysis of central cognition with theories of consciousness, it might be worth exploring 
further whether the cortical regions undergirded by rich club/ hub cores also instantiate a global neuronal workspace 
(see Baars 1988; 1997; 2002). Such a connection is beyond the purview of the present discussion, but further 
investigation may nonetheless prove worthwhile. 
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concerning this sort of inference. The evidence adduced by cognitive neuroscience and brain 
network theory lends support for my thesis, but perhaps fall short of being decisive. Admittedly, 
any attempt to integrate a theory of cognitive mechanisms with neural models is a task that is 
highly speculative in nature and presents a host of explanatory limitations (Weiskopf 2016). 
However, the evidential support is sufficient to cast doubt on the selection pressures objection, 
which argued against the plausibility of domain-general computational systems evolving to 
govern central cognition. I demonstrated why there is no need to posit a general exogenous 
selection pressure to account for the evolution of a domain-general, non-modular processor. 
However, I do not mean to imply that modules have no explanatory merit. Proponents of MM 
may be on the right track in positing some domain-specific modules in cognitive architecture, 
especially perceptual input systems. But given the inadequacy of modules in accounting for the 
functional capacities of the rich club/hub core, we may conclude (based on the available 
evidence) that endogenous pressure selected for a non-modular system. Thus, proponents of EP 
should regard the non-MM architecture as not only compatible with their paradigm, but as the 
cognitive architecture that best explains which brain variants of structural organization that 
endogenous pressures selected for.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
What I have argued is that the term selection pressure is open to various interpretations. A 
given interpretation determines the sort of cognitive architecture that conforms most closely to 
the principles of evolutionary psychology (Woodward & Cowie 2004: 3). I introduced a 
distinction between selection pressures that are either endogenous or exogenous. Granting this 
distinction forms the basis for predicting that a domain-general, non-massively modular 
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architecture emerged during the evolution of cognitive architecture, rather than a massively 
modular one. Evolutionary models lacking the distinction between endogenous and exogenous 
pressures cannot account for the factors that selected for different neural network structures like 
the rich club/hub core. Evolutionary theorists of the cognitive mind should extend their 
explanatory scope, and not just look at external environmental structures to formulate hypotheses 
about the cognitive mind. Recognizing that the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness 
corresponds to brain organization itself, to factors inside the skull, leads to a plausible hypothesis 
about the evolutionary origins of central cognition.  
This paper is not a defense of the explanatory merit of evolutionary psychology per se. 
Indeed, philosophers should be wary of relying too heavily on evolutionary psychology in 
promoting any particular architectural framework. One flaw that bedevils EP lies at the heart of 
its methodology. Reverse engineering systems in the cognitive mind reveal what that system 
does, but not necessarily why that system was selected for serving that function; hence, the 
importance of seeking out independent strands of evidence that converge on any given 
adaptationist explanation. Objections to EP per se aside, my objective is more modest in scope, 
in that the foregoing is meant to show how reframing the notion of a selection pressure in EP 
uncovers the fitness benefits conferred by a non-MM cognitive architecture. I maintain that the 
arguments in this paper should compel those partial to MM architectures to explore lines of 
argumentative support aside from the selection pressures objection. Further empirical 
investigation in the cognitive sciences and brain network theory may yet vindicate the MM 
thesis, but the current evidence from these research domains point in favor of the non-MM 
cognitive architecture. As things stand, we have in hand a plausible evolutionary story of how 
domain-general central cognition emerged through the process of natural selection. 
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